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Abstract  
In the context of achieving the new Sustainable Development Goals, revenue mobilization is 
a high priority in developing countries and in Sub-Saharan Africa, where governments’ ability 
to tax remains limited. Using a unique revenue dataset spanning the period 1980-2010, we 
analyze three important tax reforms: the Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU), the Value Added Tax 
(VAT), and the Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agency (SARA). We propose an ex-post impact 
assessment of these tax reforms in SSA countries based on propensity-score matching 
methodology (PSM) and synthetic control method (SCM). VAT and SARA are found to have 
an unambiguously large and positive effect on non-resource taxes, while the impact of LTU is 
insignificant—LTU seems however an important precondition for the adoption of the first 
two reforms. We conclude also that VAT and SARA display some synergy, and their positive 
effects strengthen several years after their adoption.  
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1. Introduction
Taxation is a core function of the state. It contributes to the social contract between the 
state and citizens. The history of state formation highlights the preponderant role of taxation 
in the relationship between rulers and citizens (Friedman, 1974, and Tilly, 1990). Recent 
research suggests that this relationship is important in developing countries, where state 
building should rely on governments’ ability to raise taxes (Brautigam et al., 2008; and 
Besley and Persson, 2011). Beyond the academic circle, the recent United Nation Financing 
for Development Conference in Addis Ababa (July 2015) highlighted the crucial role of 
domestic revenue mobilization in developing countries to achieve the post-2015 sustainable 
development goals (SDGs). Domestic revenue mobilization was already a priority in the 
international policy debate since the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development in 
2002 (reaffirmed in 2008), and as emphasized by several international organizations (IMF, 
2011, 2014, and 2015; OECD 2010(a, b) and 2014; Mascagni et al., 2014 for the European 
Union).  
Part of the relationship between state building and taxation finds its source in the economic 
theory of public enforcement of (tax) law (see Shavell and Polinsky, 2000), in particular the 
amount of resources devoted to apprehend violators, or equivalently here to implement tax 
laws.
1
 Some of these theoretical analyses find their practical use in a number of tax policy
and administration innovations or reforms. We consider three of the most important of these 
reforms over the past decades in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA): setting-up Large Taxpayers 
Units (LTUs); introducing Value Added Taxes (VATs); and reorganizing tax administrations 
in Semi-Autonomous Revenue Authorities (SARAs). In 1980, two of the 41 SSA countries 
our data covers had a VAT: Côte d’Ivoire (1960) and Senegal (1980); none had implemented 
a LTU or a SARA. By 2010, 34 had adopted a VAT, 21 had an LTU, and 17 had a SARA. 
Over the same period, the revenue-to-GDP ratio passes on average from 17.7 percent to 
18.5 percent, and from 13.3 percent to 15.3 percent if we exclude revenue from non-
1
Another part of this relationship results from the political economy analysis, which links the tax system to government’s 
accountability. 
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renewable natural resources.
2
 These reforms have been core elements in government’s efforts
to improve revenue mobilization, an important factor of economic development as 
emphasized by Acemoglu (2005) or Besley and Persson (2013). 
A common denominator of LTU, VAT, and SARA is that they all aim to increase revenue 
through better compliance with tax laws. The LTU consists in a rationalization of the tax 
administration through the segmentation of taxpayers according to some measure of size—
frequently turnover. The VAT, in addition to being an important tax policy reform,
3
 is a
partial delegation of revenue collection to the private sector; its self-enforcing mechanism 
(through the credit-invoice method) and spreading of tax collection along the production-
distribution chain are key elements of its quality as a tax.
4
 A SARA corresponds to a strategic
delegation of tax collection to an agent, more or less autonomous from the government. Two 
reasons are frequently advanced in favor of adopting a SARA: reduce political interferences 
with the collection of taxes; provide better human resource incentives (e.g. pay, bonuses, 
managerial flexibility) than usually provided in the general public service. Both of these 
reasons tend to be particularly relevant in SSA, and more generally in developing countries.  
Each of these three reforms has a possible (expected positive) impact on revenue 
mobilization. But each may suffer from design defects that could weaken its expected impact 
or even yield the opposite result (a negative impact on revenue). For instance, LTUs may 
induce too much resources allocated to well-known and visible taxpayers, and not enough to 
the rest of the tax population; depending on the relative size of each group, the final impact 
of LTU on tax revenue may actually be negative. The effectiveness of a VAT depends on a 
number of policy choices, including: rate(s), registration threshold(s), exemptions, and 
limitations on refunds; these are particularly important in cases where the VAT replaced one 
or several other transaction taxes—the case of most SSA countries that adopted a VAT. 
Finally, SARA may not have enough autonomy and financial resources to achieve its revenue 
goals. 
2
 Non-renewable natural resources include oil, gas, and minerals. Total revenue is defined as tax revenues plus revenue from extractive 
industries (mainly, royalties, profit sharing, and the general corporate income tax, or profit tax in countries that still use a schedular tax 
system). 
3
 VAT was often introduced as a substitute to distortionary sales taxes and in the context of decreasing tariff rates. 
4
 In addition to the fact that in theory it is a tax on a broad base (i.e. final consumption), and is more efficient compared to most other 
taxes in the typical taxation arsenal of a country. 
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 This paper presents for the first time an ex-post impact assessment of LTU, VAT, and 
SARA in SSA countries. It contributes in several ways to the debate on tax reforms and 
revenue mobilization in SSA. First, it provides an assessment of the effectiveness of each of 
the three considered reforms on domestic non-resource revenue. This complements previous 
work studying the efficiency of some tax reforms in developing countries (e.g., Keen and 
Lockwood, 2010, for the VAT
5
). Second, beyond the average effect of each reform, potential
synergies among them are captured by considering their combined impact. Third, the 
dynamic effect of each reform is appreciated through their respective impact on revenue 
depending on a time horizon.  
Our database allows us to isolate the effect of these reforms on non-resource tax revenue, 
which excludes royalties and corporate income tax on natural resource extractive activities 
(i.e. upstream mining, oil, and gas).
6
 Since the latter is strongly affected by international
commodity price volatility, and since the responsibility for its collection is frequently shared 
by several ministries or agencies,
7
 excluding these revenues better captures the impact of
each studied reform on domestic revenue mobilization efforts. Moreover, the taxation of 
natural resources raises political economy issues that are fundamentally different from issues 
raised by taxes whose incidence fall (ultimately) on individuals.  
We consider each tax reform: LTU, VAT, and SARA as a “treatment” to improve revenue 
mobilization. We apply the propensity-score matching methodology (PSM) as developed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and the synthetic control method (SCM) as established by 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). The former allows us to appreciate synergy between studied 
tax reforms, while the latter focuses on the dynamic impact of each reform. Both 
methodologies present the advantage to rely on a transparent way in building counterfactual. 
Our PSM analysis concludes that VAT and SARA improve non-resource revenue by 2 
percentage and 4 percentage points of GDP, respectively. Moreover, combining VAT and 
5
 To our knowledge, there is no similar empirical analysis on the effects of LTUs and SARAs on domestic non-resource revenues. 
6
 As robustness tests, we also examine the impact of each reform and their combinations on total tax revenues. The results are 
unchanged. 
7
 It is frequent in SSA that royalties and production sharing are collected sectoral ministries or specialized government agencies, such as 
national oil companies. Revenue mobilization in this case cannot be attributed to SARAs or LTUs. 
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 SARA may even increase non-resource revenue by 4.5 to 6.5 percentage points of GDP 
(compared to the scenario of no VAT and SARA), while the combination of the three 
reforms has an impact of about 1.2 to 2.4 percentage points of GDP. If the creation of a LTU 
has no significant direct impact on revenue mobilization, it appears as an important 
precondition for the adoption of the other two reforms, especially VAT.  
We extend our analysis by considering that the impact of studied tax reforms may take 
several years to fully materialize.
8
 This dynamic approach leads to the application of the
SCM, as proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and extended by Abadie, Diamond, 
and Hainmueller (2010), and Cavallo et al. (2013), to apprehend average impact of each 
reform over time. The counterfactual here is based on similarity between treated and not 
treated countries before tax reforms occurred with respect to relevant covariates and past tax 
revenue-to GDP ratios. This analysis confirms also our previous results: VATs and SARAs 
have a positive and strong impact on tax revenue, while the effect of LTUs is more 
ambiguous. These conclusions are not only valid for the short-term impact but also for the 
medium term. Indeed, VAT and SARA have both a significant and stronger positive impact 
after 5 years of their implementation. It is worth noting that the dynamic positive effects of 
the VAT tend to soften in the medium term while the SARA’s effect remains strong.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II provides an overview of the 
reforms, with emphasis on their strengths and weaknesses in SSA countries. Section III 
presents the data source and variables of interest. The empirical analysis is developed in 
section IV. Section V concludes.  
2. The Reforms: VAT, LTU, and SARA
Among other objectives, VATs, LTUs, and SARAs share the common goal of improving 
compliance, hence revenue. Each presents some advantages in terms of improved revenue 
collection, but each is also exposed to risks. This section briefly reviews the strengths and 
weaknesses of these reforms, which helps to form expectations about the sign of their 
potential impact on revenue.  
8
 Moreover, the studied events may have been modified over time: governments introduce new VAT exemptions and limit refunds; they 
change the registration threshold for the VAT, and the definition of a large enterprise for purposes of the LTU; SARAs induce new 
relationships between taxpayers, tax policy makers, and tax collectors.  
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 a. Value Added Taxes
The VAT has been adopted by more than 150 countries, in the majority of cases replacing 
distortionary cascading sales taxes and/or trade taxes. The VAT is first and foremost a 
fundamental policy reform. Its main quality lies in that in theory, it falls on final 
consumption and is neutral on production decisions. In other words, it targets a large tax 
base, and is growth friendly. In practice, however, this quality depends largely on the design 
features of the VAT, such as the number of rates, the prevalence of exemptions, the level and 
number of registration thresholds, and the limitations on refunding excess VAT credits—to 
name just a few (see Bird and Gendron, 2011). Also, while the production-neutrality property 
of the VAT has generally been an important factor in countries’ decision to adopt it, the 
benefits from such neutrality—in terms of improving resource allocation in an economy—are 
usually less important in developing countries where the number of production stages is 
relatively small. 
Beyond its qualities as a policy instrument, the VAT is believed to improve compliance 
and reduce risks to revenue collection. First, it is collected by firms at the various stages of 
the value chain through the invoice-credit mechanism, which provides an incentive to report 
purchases (input) in order to claim a credit/refund against VAT on sales (output). Second, the 
credit-invoice partitions revenue collection along the value chain, and reduces the risks of 
revenue loss—relative, for example, to the retail sales tax, the economic-equivalent of VAT.  
There compliance and administrative benefits can, however, be overstated. The incentive to 
underreport VAT on output increases when sales are made to final consumers or to non-
registered entities; in essence the seller keeps some of VAT collections rather than remitting 
them to the government. The credit-invoice mechanism may even create informality chains 
as stressed by Paula and Scheinkman (2010) for Brazil. The possibility of claiming a VAT 
refund introduces also a risk of fraudulent practices that other taxes that the VAT replaced do 
not suffer from. These risks can be important in SSA, where VAT implementation frequently 
coincided with difficult budget situations, leading to the choice of high VAT rates, and too 
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2016
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 many exemptions.
9
 These, in turn, shrink the tax base, and break the VAT chain, weakening
compliance and enforcement, and providing more opportunities for fraudulent refund claims.  
Another technical dimension which matters for the success of the VAT in mobilizing 
revenue, particularly in SSA where administrative capacity is limited, is the registration 
threshold. This threshold is usually determined in terms of turnover and results from a 
delicate trade-off. If it is too low, the tax administration is likely to be stretched and unable to 
monitor registered firms effectively; the probability of audit is weak and the credibility of the 
VAT is compromised. If it is too high, the VAT base is narrower (see Kanbur and Keen, 
2014 for an analysis of the optimal threshold). More problematic, the tax is not neutral for 
firms below the threshold, since they pay the VAT on their inputs, and are not allowed to 
claim it back. These firms usually exert pressure on the VAT base in the form of lobbying for 
exemptions of inputs that go into the production of their outputs (agriculture is perhaps the 
most common example in SSA). If such lobbying efforts are unsuccessful, these firms are 
more likely to deal with other unregistered firms, which would reinforce structural dualism 
and may affect growth by making participation in the formal sector less attractive.
10
b. Large Taxpayers Units
The introduction of LTUs contributes to the effort of rationalizing a tax administration by 
consolidating all its functions under one umbrella for large taxpayers. The emphasis on 
segmentation of taxpayers according to size, of which the LTU is one organizational form, 
occurred initially in Latin America in the late 70s, and is considered as one of the most 
important features of the modernization of tax administrations in developing countries (see, 
for instance, Baer, 2002). It consists in establishing a self-contained office within the tax 
administration, acting as a single clearance window for large taxpayers for the main domestic 
taxes: income taxes, VAT, sector-specific taxes (e.g. resource royalties), etc.  
Several advantages can be expected from a LTU. First, segmentation improves the 
specialization of the personnel of the tax administration by allowing a better coverage of 
9
 In particular, trade liberalization imposed a significant stress on public revenue in SSA, where taxes on international trade remain 
important. This effect was accentuated by IMF programs, which were significant in the adoption of VAT (see Keen and Lockwood, 2010). 
These may explain why VAT rates were relatively high in SSA (generally above 15 percent). 
10
 A similar argument is made in Emran and Stiglitz (2004). 
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 heterogeneous taxpayers with different sets of compliance behavior and risk. This 
specialization may be reinforced by an internal organization of LTUs by economic sector, 
improving the knowledge of its personnel on sector-specific issues. The division of tasks 
(return processing, assessment, audit, collections, etc.) inside LTUs may also contribute to 
reduce corruption by reducing the number of interactions with taxpayers (McCarten, 2005). 
Second, efficiency can be gained from the centralization of core functions for all taxes. For 
example, auditing a large taxpayer simultaneously for income taxes and VAT has obvious 
advantages that can be hard to obtain in different organizational settings without seamless 
information sharing across various units of a tax administration.  
Finally, the creation of LTUs has been found to be an opportunity to induce other 
efficiency-improving reforms such as self-assessment, adoption of unique taxpayer 
identification numbers, electronic filling, and new computerized information system (Baer, 
2002; and McCarten, 2005). Once introduced in the context of an LTU, these reforms can be 
rolled out across the whole tax administration, thus improving revenue collection and 
reducing administrative and compliance costs.   
LTUs may, however, have some negative impacts on revenue. Establishing a LTU is only a 
first step in the segmentation and coverage of the taxpayers’ population, which also requires 
a focus on middle and small taxpayers—this is still very much work in progress in SSA. This 
partial rationalization of tax administration may perturb the right balance of resource 
allocation between known taxpayers, and tax evaders (Terkper, 2003). LTUs do not address 
directly the latter. But LTUs are generally expected to address the problem of underreporting 
income and other forms of tax avoidance and evasion by large taxpayers, which is the key 
issue in sectors where economic activity is dominated by large taxpayers.  
LTUs may also worsen the revenue situation by concentrating tax administration resources 
(particularly, most competent human resources) on a small number of large taxpayers. Such 
imbalances favor the emergence of a dual economy, where a large part of tax revenue comes 
from a few taxpayers. Over time, this can increase the concentration of revenue, lead to a 
distorting tax system (Auriol and Warlters, 2005), and create incentives for rent seeking 
(Burgess and Stern, 1993). Unless the benefits of LTUs are spread out to the rest of the tax 
administration fairly quickly, LTUs may not improve the revenue performance of the overall 
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2016
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 tax administration, even if they may be beneficial in collecting revenue more effectively and 
efficiently from large taxpayers.  
LTUs may trigger strategic behavior from taxpayers. For example, taxpayers may break-up 
their activities in order to remain below the LTU threshold (Terkper, 2003). Dhramapala, 
Slemrod, and Wilson (2011) show how a differentiated treatment of small and large firms 
may involve a missing middle with costly tax collection.
11
 The efficiency of LTUs may even
hinder its initial purpose by motivating some large taxpayers to obtain tax advantages 
through derogatory regimes (something quite common in many developing countries in 
sectors such as telecommunications, mining, large infrastructure, and other activities 
dominated by multinationals). In that sense, the increase in tax incentives provided under 
investment codes can be viewed as a reaction to the improvement in tax-law enforcement 
(Keen and Mansour, 2010b).  
c. Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies
First implemented in Africa by Ghana in 1985, the SARA is a drastic reform consisting in 
delegating tax collection to an autonomous agency. This delegation of power, which occurred 
in other fields such as monetary policy with the independence of central banks, is a strategic 
device to improve the credibility of tax law enforcement. But the main reasons for the 
independence of SARAs is not time-inconsistency, as presented by Kydland and Prescott 
(1994); rather, it is to isolate revenue collection from political interferences, provide 
management autonomy, and merge customs revenue collection function and tax 
administrations into a single entity.
12
The autonomy, which may differ significantly across countries, is a signal to a more 
credible audit policy, since control should be realized without any political interference. For 
Taliercio (2004), SARA is even a credible commitment of the government towards more 
competent, effective, and fair tax collection. Based on surveys in four Latin American 
11
 This may be true for VAT too. Onji (2009) shows that the VAT introduction in 1989 in Japan triggered a clustering of firms just 
below the turnover threshold. 
12
 Fjeldstad and Moore (2009) consider a third one, which is facilitating other reforms such as introducing identification numbers.  
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 countries,
13
 the author establishes a significant and positive relationship between the
perception of a higher autonomy of SARA and better performances in tax collection. This 
signal effect is reinforced by the greater flexibility of SARA to manage its human resources 
than standard public sector agencies. Indeed, recruitment, promotion, and dismissal do not 
have to respect civil service’s rules, allowing a number of flexibilities, such as higher wages 
(Fjeldstadt and Moore, 2009 and Moore, 2014).  
The second important advantage of SARAs is the integration of revenue collections by 
merging tax and customs administration. The rationale for merging the two is: (i) exploiting 
synergies, in particular for VAT on imports (Keen, 2008); (ii) saving costs by combining 
operational functions in tax collections (World Bank, 2010). Given the complementary role 
of customs and tax administration, the lack of coordination in their operations often explains 
the poor performance in domestic revenue in SSA countries (e.g. a large importer/retailer 
may avoid VAT registration with the domestic tax administration as long as customs do not 
share data on imports with the domestic tax agency).   
However, SARAs may raise some particular issues. First, the credibility of the 
commitment is far from equivalent to that of an independent Central Bank. Importantly, 
SARAs are not typically in charge of tax policy, a core function of macro-economic 
management that remains in the hands of the government and parliament. Second, SARA 
may be implemented partially only (see Kidd and Crandall, 2006), in particular without 
integrating tax and customs administrations. Third, the tasks assignment between SARA and 
the ministry of finance may be somewhat blurred, inducing some conflicting relationships 
fueled by the lack of ownership of tax reforms (and influence over them). The separation 
between tax collection and tax policy may even pose a threat on the consistency of 
policymaking (Fjeldstad and Moore, 2009). Another issue raised by Moore (2014) is the 
mobility of tax auditors from SARA to the private sector and the induced threat of conflicts 
13
The author uses surveys of 200 large taxpayers and tax consultants in Bolivia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela in 1998 and 1999. 
Bolivia is characterized by a standard tax administration, while Mexico and Venezuela have a SARA, each being considered as less 
autonomous than the Peruvian SARA.
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 of interests.
14
 Finally, SARA may be particularly disruptive since current civil servants
working in tax or customs administration are not sure to be hired by the new agency. This 
transitory period may be particularly costly in terms of revenue mobilization.  
3. Data and Stylized Facts
a. Data
This paper uses a unique revenue dataset for SSA countries, constructed primarily from 
IMF staff documents and other sources.
15
 It presents two advantages for the study of the
reforms considered in this paper. First, it covers 41 countries over the period 1980-2010, a 
period that spans all the considered reforms in SSA. The revenue dataset is completed by 
data on the dates of adoption of LTUs (Baer, 2002, and Fossat and Bua, 2013), VAT 
(IMF Fiscal Affairs Department VAT database), and SARAs (Kloeden, 2011, and Fjeldstad 
and Moore, 2009).
16
Figure 1 shows average tax revenue-to-GDP ratios with and without natural resource 
revenue, and linear fitted values, over 1980-2010. From 13.3 percent of GDP in 1980, non-
resource revenue increased to 15.4 percent in 2010. Most of this increase occurred over 
2000-2010; revenues were stagnant or slightly declining over 1980-2000. The impressive 
increase in revenue came from non-renewable natural resources (essentially royalties and 
corporate income taxes on upstream activities from oil, gas and mining). A closer 
examination of the data reveals that in 2010 resource revenues were highly concentrated in 
oil producing countries—about 75 percent in Nigeria and Angola, and 15 percent in 
Francophone Central Africa (Cameroon, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon). Thus, non-
resource revenue mobilization is still a real challenge in SSA. 
The evolution of non-resource revenue differs significantly among SSA countries over the 
period considered. For instance, while Uganda, Chad, and Ghana tripled or doubled (for the 
latter) their tax revenue, Togo, Central African Republic, Madagascar, and Zambia lost 
14
 A theoretical issue that SARAs induce is the standard informational asymmetry between the Principal, the government, and the 
Agent, the SARA (Sanchez and Sobel, 1993). 
15
 See Mansour (2014) for a detailed description. The dataset updates and expands on that in Keen and Mansour (2010a).  
16
 Appendix Table A1 provides reform dates for all countries in the dataset. 
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 respectively 42 percent, 35 percent, 34 percent, and 29 percent. Figure 2 illustrates the 
disparate evolution of tax revenue for four countries: Benin, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal and 
shows the date of the three studied reforms in each country. 
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the adoption of LTU, VAT, and SARA. Most of these 
reforms started in the mid-1990s, and accelerated rapidly through 2005. VAT was adopted 
earlier, and by more countries than the other two reforms. The speed of adoption of the three 
reforms suggests that they may be highly correlated. The VAT is now present in nearly all 
SSA countries; this is not the case of the other two reforms. Finally, a key point to note is 
that a significant number of these reforms were implemented under an IMF program—
suggesting that both short-term revenue mobilization and efficiencies in tax collections were 
important objectives of the reforms. 
Figure 4 displays a Venn diagram of the reforms in 2010. Only five countries: Burundi, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and South Africa have adopted all three reforms, while none has 
only LTU and SARA. It is also noticeable that one country (Sierra Leone) has SARA only 
without having at least one of the other two reforms, and one country only (Comoros) has 
LTU without one of the other two. The largest combinations of reforms are VAT-SARA and 
VAT-LTU.  
FIGURE 1. AVERAGE (UNWEIGHTED) NON-RESOURCE TAXES TO GDP IN SSA (1980-2010) 
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Non natural resource tax revenue / GDP Fitted values
Tax revenue / GDP Fitted values
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 FIGURE 2. NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP AND REFORMS DATES: SELECTED COUNTRIES 
FIGURE 3. THE ADOPTION OF LTU, VAT AND SARA IN SSA (1980-2010) 
FIGURE 4. VENN DIAGRAM OF ADOPTION DATES OF VATS, LTUS AND SARAS IN 2010 
Source: www.bioinformatics.lu 
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 b. Reform sequencing
An important source of variation in the data is the sequencing of the tax reform adoption by 
countries. While the econometric investigations will provide an answer to the fundamental 
question of the effectiveness of the tax reforms, it is also particularly important to understand 
first how the reforms are packaged. For example, which of the three reforms is more likely to 
be implemented first, and which one would follow?  
These questions have critical implications on the way the econometric estimates (the 
average treatment effects) will be interpreted. Let us assume for instance that an LTU tends 
to be implemented last. This would suggest that when running a regression of the effect of 
LTU on revenue, one runs the risk of associating the point estimate with LTU itself instead 
of recognizing that some of those effects may be multiplicative and complementary by 
involving the effects of the other reforms. Finding a positive and significant association 
between LTU and revenue may simply be the result of a confounding bias associated with 
the effect of other reforms already in place (VAT and SARA in this context). 
Figure 5 allows an appreciation of the dynamic aspect of the three tax reforms. There are 
41 sequences corresponding to the 41 SSA countries in the database. The number of 
occurrences (countries) is shown on the y-axis, and is associated with each reform 
combination. For example, the first-five blue bars indicate that 5 countries over the period of 
the study (1980―2010) have not implemented any of the three reforms we discuss: Angola, 
Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland.
17
 Note the prominent role
played by the VAT, as the majority of countries adopted the VAT first. SARAs have also 
been adopted earlier than LTUs—although there are three cases where LTU and SARA were 
adopted simultaneously. After VAT adoption, the most immediate reform to follow is the 
LTU,
18
 but there are cases in which LTU adoption precedes VAT.
17
 This case is not presented in our Venn diagram. 
18
 This goes against standard advice to set up LTUs before proceeding with VAT implementation.  
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 FIGURE 5. THE SEQUENCE OF REFORMS ADOPTION IN SSA (1980-2010) 
Source: authors. 
4. Empirical Analysis
This section provides an assessment of the effects of each of the three tax reforms on 
revenue. Measuring the effects of the implementation of tax reforms (including 
combinations) is an empirical exercise similar to the investigation of the effects of specific 
programs on socio-economic outcomes (using micro data). Methods borrowed from the 
impact evaluation literature can be applied in our context. We propose two complementing 
empirical approaches: propensity score matching (PCM) estimates and the synthetic control 
method (SCM), which is a generalization of the difference-in-difference technique to 
quantify the causal effects of VAT, LTU and SARA on the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio.
19
Ideally, the causal effects of the tax reforms would be estimated from the implementation 
of a random assignment of the allocation of LTUs, VATs and SARAs between countries. 
This would ensure that the control group (countries that randomly have not received the 
19
 In an appendix available upon request we estimate fixed-effects and dynamic panel estimates with fixed-effects, which capture the 
heterogeneity in the date of tax reform adoption among countries. We observe that VATs and SARAs improve non-resource revenue by 1 to 
2 percent of GDP, while the impact of LTUs is much lower and only significant at 5 percent. The latter vanishes when the three reforms are 
considered simultaneously. 
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 treatment) is the relevant counterfactual group (i.e. what would have happened to the tax-to-
GDP ratio in a situation where the treated country did not implement the reform). In the real 
world, conducting such experiments at the cross-country level and in a large-scale is not 
feasible. The econometric investigations should therefore find ways to bypass the 
fundamental problem of finding an acceptable counterfactual group to estimate an unbiased 
effect of the reforms.
20
Since it is widely thought that mobilizing additional revenue has been a primary objective 
of the three reforms considered, we would expect them to have a positive effect on the non-
resource revenue-to-GDP ratio. However, because other objectives have also been pursued 
(e.g. improving tax administration efficiency and taxpayer services; replacing tariff revenues 
and cascading sales taxes with VAT; etc), and for reasons discussed above on possible poor 
or incomplete design of the reforms, the effect may be nil or negative. These expectations 
hold for the individual and combined effects of the reforms.  
a. Propensity Score Matching Estimates and Reforms Interaction
Framework 
We first use the propensity score matching technique (PSM) to investigate the impact of 
each tax reform on the non-resource taxes-to-GDP.
21
 This involves comparing country
groups following a two-step approach: 
 First, the probability of observing VAT, LTU or SARA in a given country in year t, is
estimated conditional on observable economic conditions and country characteristics
(selection model). We follow Keen and Lockwood (2010) and model the probability of a
given tax reform as a function of lagged macroeconomic variables, including the level of
past revenue, trade openness, resource rents, value added of the agriculture sector, and a
dummy variable identifying IMF arrangements; we also control for some demographic
factors, namely the age demographic dependency ratio and total population. In some
20
 The selection-bias associated with the decision to adopt the tax reform could be large. Indeed, countries tend to embark into reforms 
under certain specific macroeconomic or socio-political circumstances that may well be correlated with fiscal performance. Put differently, 
the adoption of a specific reform is conditional on the expected gains/benefits associated with the reform. For example, countries with poor 
performance in revenue are more likely to embark into ambitious reforms. Ignoring this simple regularity in the data would lead to 
underestimate the impact of the reform on revenue mobilization. On the other hand, some reforms are more likely to be adopted in good 
rather than bad times. Ignoring this bias could result in an over-estimation of the true effect of the reform on the outcome variable. The 
econometric framework we use in this paper aims at tackling the estimation biases to better capture the reform’s impacts. 
21
 The use of the PSM technique in the macroeconomic literature has been popularized by recent empirical papers focusing on the 
effects of the inflation-targeting arrangement on macroeconomic performances (Lin and Ye, 2007), on the effects of fiscal rules on fiscal 
behavior in developing countries (Tapsoba, 2012), and on the economic effects of foreign capital flows (Chari, Chen, and Dominguez, 
2012), and on the effects of IMF programs on various macroeconomic outcomes (Bal-Gunduz et al., 2013). 
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 alternative specifications, we perform estimations aimed at gauging the spillovers from 
one reform into the likelihood of implementing another. More precisely, we investigate 
whether the initial adoption of a given tax reform determines the probability of adopting a 
subsequent one. By doing so, we formally test the sequencing of the reforms. We make 
use of the propensity score matching framework to investigate the effects of reform 
packages on revenue. Does it pay off to adopt two or three of the tax reforms? What is 
the additional tax revenue ratio generated by the adoption of various sets of reforms? 
Each tax reform, or package, has its own selection equation using the same battery of 
control variables to extract predicted probabilities of observing a particular tax reform in 
each country. 
 Second, these probabilities, or propensity scores, are used to match reform countries to
non-reform countries, and thereby construct a statistical control group.
The matching based on the likelihood of adopting a tax reform ensures similarity of initial 
macroeconomic conditions and country characteristics in the control group. The control 
provides a proxy for the counterfactual—i.e., the tax ratio if a country had not implemented 
the reform. The effect of the tax reform is then calculated as the mean difference in the non-
resource tax -to-GDP ratio across the two groups. Inference is made via bootstrapping 
techniques. We present results using nearest-neighbor, radius, and Kernel matching.
22
Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the first step of the PSM approach. They report probit estimations of 
the adoption of one or a combination of the studied reforms. This extends Keen and 
Lockwood (2010) in two ways: First, we estimate the probability of adopting LTU or SARA 
in addition to VAT; second, we are able to appreciate the spillover effect of one reform on 
the probability of adopting another; for instance, we can assess if having already in place a 
LTU or a SARA would favor the adoption of VAT, while controlling for other determinants 
of the reforms. 
Income per capita, the age dependency ratio, and the size of the agricultural sector have the 
expected impact on the adoption probability of each reform. Moreover, as in Keen and 
Lockwood (2010), participation in an IMF program has a significant and positive impact on 
22
 The nearest-neighbor matching estimator sorts all records by the estimated propensity score and then searches forward and backward 
for the closest control units. We make use of the three, four, and five nearest neighbors. Radius matching uses all comparison observations 
within a predefined distance around the propensity score. Kernel matching entails a weighted average of the outcome of all non-treated 
units, where the weights are related to their proximity to the treated unit. 
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 adopting any of the reforms.
23
 In contrast, however, trade openness does not reduce
significantly the probability of adopting a VAT or LTU, but improves the probability of 
adopting a SARA. 
Table 1 displays some interactions between the three studied tax reforms. A striking result 
is the huge and significant impact of having a LTU in place on the adoption of VAT. Indeed, 
the predicted probability of adopting VAT is 0.77 greater for a country, which has a LTU 
than for a country, which does not. We remark also that having a LTU has a positive impact 
on adopting a SARA: The marginal effect of LTU on VAT is lower (0.09), but significant at 
1 percent. Symmetrically, having a VAT or a SARA improves respectively by 0.558 and 0.22 
the probability of adopting a LTU. Finally, we notice that there is no direct interaction 
between VAT and SARA. 
Table 3 shows the final results of the PSM estimations for each reform separately. There is 
a robust and significant effect of the presence of the VAT and SARA but no statistical effect 
is found regarding the LTU. Having a VAT in place leads to a gain of about 2 percentage 
points of GDP in additional tax revenue compared to the counterfactual scenario of no VAT. 
For the SARA, the effect is much larger: 2.6 to 4 percentage points of GDP, depending on 
the matching algorithms. The absence of results from the LTU echoes the results found 
above in the fixed-effects specifications. 
23
 The issue of the endogeneity of an IMF program is discussed in Keen and Lockwood (2010, page 144). 
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2016
20
 TABLE 1. CORRELATES OF REFORMS: PROBIT ESTIMATES AND MARGINAL EFFECTS 
TABLE 2. CORRELATES OF REFORMS COMBINATIONS: PROBIT ESTIMATES AND MARGINAL EFFECTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VAT LTU SARA VAT LTU SARA
Non-resource taxes-to-GDP, lagged -0.00608** -0.00711*** -0.000436 -0.00393 -0.00703** 0.000661
(0.00303) (0.00243) (0.00180) (0.00345) (0.00289) (0.00180)
Age dependency ratio -0.0169*** -0.0120*** -0.00844*** -0.0124*** -0.00613*** -0.00745***
(0.00202) (0.00146) (0.00106) (0.00224) (0.00168) (0.00108)
Agriculture value added-to-GDP -0.0167*** -0.00183 0.000149 -0.0207*** 0.00564*** 0.00156
(0.00196) (0.00144) (0.00100) (0.00209) (0.00154) (0.00097)
Trade openness -0.000205 0.000876 0.00224*** -0.00143 2.39E-05 0.00208***
(0.001000) (0.000762) (0.000557) (0.001080) (0.000944) (0.000589)
IMF arrangement 0.299*** 0.115*** 0.0717*** 0.299*** 0.0201 0.0542**
(0.0424) (0.0349) (0.0240) (0.0495) (0.0368) (0.0238)
Population, log 0.281*** 0.162*** 0.139*** 0.230*** 0.0274 0.114***
(0.0190) (0.0166) (0.0118) (0.0221) (0.0188) (0.0121)
SARA dummy, lagged 0.0664 0.220***
(0.0724) (0.0421)
VAT dummy, lagged 0.558*** 0.0332
(0.0402) (0.0276)
LTU dummy, lagged 0.772*** 0.0894***
(0.0642) (0.0270)
Constant -2.467*** -1.558*** -1.755*** -2.148*** -0.445 -1.540***
(0.322) (0.267) (0.184) (0.326) (0.291) (0.182)
Number of observations 904 904 904 904 904 904
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VAT-LTU VAT-SARA LTU-SARA All Three
Total tax revenue-to-GDP, lagged -0.00112 0.000860** -9.19E-05 -0.00516***
(0.001760) (0.000397) (0.000129) (0.001200)
Age dependency ratio -0.00432*** -0.000682*** 4.52E-05 -0.00308***
(0.000951) (0.000244) (0.000064) (0.000670)
Agriculture value added-to-GDP -0.00251** -0.000144 -1.56E-05 -0.00335***
(0.001100) (0.000119) (0.000078) (0.000685)
Trade openness 0.000116 5.98E-05 -9.50E-05 0.00126***
(0.000612) (0.000076) (0.000086) (0.000314)
IMF arrangement 0.113*** 0.00876** 0.00141 0.0202
(0.026700) (0.004340) (0.001410) (0.015100)
Population, log 0.0784*** 0.00614** 0.00128 0.0833***
(0.01040) (0.00272) (0.00113) (0.00887)
Constant -1.046*** -0.0941** -0.0335 -1.065***
(0.1610) (0.0471) (0.0261) (0.1260)
Observations 904 904 904 904
Standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations for which dependent variable 
takes the value 1. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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 TABLE 3. ESTIMATES OF TREATMENT EFFECT ON NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP: STAND-ALONE REFORMS  
In Table 4, we investigate further the impact of tax reforms by focusing on the interactions 
among them. We build various feasible combinations of reforms in place and trace the effects 
on tax revenue. For example, we ask whether having both the VAT and the LTU makes a 
difference compared to the alternative group of only one of those two reforms, no reform at 
all, or only a SARA. Again, the control group in such a specification is not the pure case of 
any reform at all, but observations where a maximum of one reform is put in place.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nearest-
neighbor 
matching
Three nearest-
neighbor 
matching
Radius Kernel
Average Treatment Effect 0.353 0.758 0.517 0.545
(0.729) (0.640) (0.408) (0.407)
No. of treated 268 268 268 268
No. of controls 603 603 603 603
Observations 871 871 871 871
Average Treatment Effect 1.855*** 2.043*** 1.814*** 1.813***
(0.629) (0.548) (0.360) (0.360)
No. of treated 364 364 364 364
No. of controls 475 475 475 475
Observations 839 839 839 839
Average Treatment Effect 4.529*** 3.585*** 2.634*** 2.805***
(0.807) (0.659) (0.535) (0.531)
No. of treated 169 169 169 169
No. of controls 735 735 735 735
Observations 904 904 904 904
Panel B. Treatment effect of VAT adoption
Panel C. Treatment effect of SARA adoption
Note: Observations are matched on the ‘common support’. An Epanechnikov kernel is used for kernel
matching. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are based on 100
replications of the data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel A. Treatment effect of LTU adoption
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  TABLE 4. ESTIMATES OF TREATMENT EFFECT ON NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP: REFORMS COMBINATIONS 
The econometric results suggest that while the VAT alone has a significant and positive 
average impact, the effect of VAT-LTU combination is negative with respect to no reform or 
to SARA alone. Two interpretations are possible. First, SARAs are so successful that their 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nearest-
neighbor 
matching
Three nearest-
neighbor 
matching
Radius Kernel
Average Treatment Effect -1.912** -1.533** -1.645*** -1.616***
(0.831) (0.737) (0.465) (0.469)
No. of treated 159 159 159 159
No. of controls 745 745 745 745
Observations 904 904 904 904
Average Treatment Effect 5.702 4.608 6.410*** 6.538***
(3.499) (3.003) (2.243) (2.209)
No. of treated 19 19 19 19
No. of controls 881 881 881 881
Observations 900 900 900 900
Average Treatment Effect 1.434 1.154 -0.88 -0.934
(2.200) (1.914) (1.312) (1.317)
No. of treated 6 6 6 6
No. of controls 898 898 898 898
Observations 904 904 904 904
Average Treatment Effect 0.329 1.202* 2.394*** 2.403***
(0.927) (0.711) (0.412) (0.410)
No. of treated 94 94 94 94
No. of controls 797 797 797 797
Observations 891 891 891 891
Note: Observations are matched on the ‘common support’. An Epanechnikov kernel is used for kernel
matching. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. They are based on 100
replications of the data. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Panel D. Treatment effect of LTU-VAT adoptions 
Panel E. Treatment effect of VAT-SARA adoptions
Panel F. Treatment effect of SARA-LTU adoptions
Panel G. Treatment effect of all reforms
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 inclusion in the control group outweighs the positive impact of any other reform or 
combinations. The second interpretation is that combining VAT and LTU is counter-
productive when LTU is poorly designed; together, they may promote dualism in the 
economy instead of favoring formalization: large taxpayers deal among themselves and so do 
non-large ones. Indeed, we would have expected some synergies from combining VAT and 
LTU since the LTU should reinforce the audit of large taxpayers, and the invoice credit 
mechanism should spread into the rest of the economy through large taxpayers’ purchases 
and sales, allowing the tax administration to collect information on suppliers and their 
customers. The econometric results do not show the effect of this virtuous circle. 
In contrast, the results suggest that any combination that includes the SARA delivers a 
higher revenue-to-GDP ratio compared to the alternative options, except in Panel C, where 
we investigate the effect of the couple LTU-SARA. This estimation is less reliable as the 
number of occurrences in the data where it exists is very limited (only 6 observations). 
Adopting all 3 reforms is also found to significantly increase revenue (Panel D).   
b. Synthetic Control Method for Comparative Case Studies
We apply here the synthetic control method (SCM) developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal 
(2003) and extended in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) to investigate the effect 
over time of studied tax reforms. We construct a weighted combination of potential control 
countries, the synthetic control, to approximate the most relevant characteristics of the 
country affected by the intervention (the tax reform). After the tax reform takes place in a 
specific country, the SCM can be used to estimate the counterfactual situation of this country 
by looking at the outcome trend of the synthetic control. To get a sense of the average 
treatment effect, averages of deviations between each treated country and its corresponding 
synthetic control are computed.  
The SCM is relatively recent and has become an interesting alternative tool to assess the 
causal effects of various large scale events or programs. Cavallo et al. (2013) have 
implemented the SCM to investigate the effects of natural disasters on per capita income. 
Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) applied the technique to measure the effects of trade 
liberalization on output. Gathani et al. (2013) use similar methodology to investigate the 
impact of the introduction of a one-stop shop for business registration on new firm creation.  
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 Within the SCM framework, we ask whether the adoption of the VAT, LTU or SARA in a 
given economy in year T leads to higher tax-to-GDP ratio in years T +i (with i ∈ [1, 10]) 
compared to similar countries that have not implemented such reforms. The advantage of this 
approach lies in the transparent estimation of the counterfactual outcome of the treated 
country, namely, a linear combination of untreated countries. The countries that form the 
synthetic control unit are selected by an algorithm based on their similarity to the treated 
country before the treatment with respect to relevant covariates and past realizations of the 
outcome variable (non-resource tax-to-GDP ratio). 
Another important advantage of the SCM is that unlike most of the previous estimators 
used in the literature, it can deal with endogeneity from omitted variables bias by accounting 
for the presence of time-varying unobservable confounders. This feature improves on panel 
models such as fixed effects or difference-in-differences, which can account for only time-
invariant unobservable confounders. A remaining limitation, however, is that economic 
reforms might be triggered by the anticipation of tax revenue, thus leading to endogeneity 
from reverse causation.
24
Appendix tables A2-A4 present the weights associated with the constructed synthetic 
control country for each country-reform pair. There are a few data limitations. First, the 
sample used in the synthetic control discards all countries lacking data on all the variables. 
Second, control countries must not have experienced the studied tax reform at any point of 
time over the sample period. This restriction seems particularly strict in the case of the LTU 
or the VAT. As a consequence, the small size of the “donor pool” implies that the dynamic 
treatment effects could be particularly sensitive to this group of countries and may bias the 
estimates.
25
 In the case of SARAs, the size of the “donor pool” is larger since eight countries
adopted this reform over the period 1980-2010. A detailed analysis of the impact of SARA in 
each country is then possible, but is beyond the scope of our analysis. 
24
 Another drawback of the SCM, which could be extended to all non-experimental reduced-form causal analysis, needs to be 
acknowledged (Cavallo et al., 2013): it might well be that other big events that occur simultaneously or after the tax reform took place end 
up driving the results. This can seriously bias the results upward or downward. 
25
 However, the values of the root mean square prediction error are not very large and suggest that the “donor pools” associated with 
country-reform pairs perform relatively well in aligning the pre-reforms trajectories of the tax-to-GDP ratios. 
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 Previous data constraints lead us to appreciate the average treatment effect of each reform. 
We follow the approach of Cavallo et al. (2013), which consists of including overall 
probability of significance based on permutation techniques among all treated countries. This 
allows a larger “donor pool” and consequently dampen the sensitivity bias, which arises from 
country-specific results. 
Framework 
The procedure for implementing the SCM is discussed in Appendix B. The mathematical 
formulation and the generalization of the inference technique are borrowed from Cavallo et 
al. (2013). The usual statistical significance, based on regression-based standard errors, is not 
relevant in our case since the uncertainty regarding the estimate of the causal effect of tax 
reform does not come from uncertainty about the aggregate data. We then have to combine 
the placebo effects to account for the fact that we are interested in doing inference about the 
average (normalized) effect estimated across the country-specific comparative case studies of 
each tax reform.  
Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and Cavallo et al. (2013), 
we use exact inference techniques, similar to permutation tests, to conduct inference in 
comparative case studies. The important contribution by Cavallo et al. (2013) over previous 
studies is to extend the idea in Abadie et al. (2010) by generalizing the placebo approach to 
produce quantitative inference in comparative case studies for the average treatment effect. 
We follow the same procedure discussed in their study. It consists in using permutation tests 
to examine the statistical significance of the results: we separately assume that every other 
country in the control sample for a given country exposed to the reform implements a similar 
(and imaginary) tax reform in the same year. We then produce counterfactual synthetic 
control for each “placebo control”. These synthetic counterfactuals are then used to calculate 
the impact of the placebo tax reform in every year following its (non)-occurrence. This 
allows for assessing whether the effect estimated by the synthetic control for the country 
exposed to a particular tax reform is large relative to the effect estimated for a country 
randomly chosen (which was not exposed to the tax reform at all). 
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 Results 
The econometric results are shown in figures 6 to 11. They confirm earlier findings that 
both VAT and SARA have significant positive effects on non-resource tax revenue (Figures 
8 and 10). For example, 5 years after the adoption of the VAT, the non-resource tax revenue-
to-GDP is larger than it was at the time of the VAT adoption, whereas it is roughly 
unchanged in the counterfactual scenario of no VAT adoption. For the SARAs, tax revenue is 
also larger few years after their implementation compared to both the beginning of the reform 
and the counterfactual scenario by about 2 percentage points of GDP. These effects are 
statistically significant as shown in Figures 9 and 11. The LTU reform is not found to exert 
any particularly significant effect on revenue (Figures 6-7), consistent with earlier findings 
from the propensity score matching techniques and panel fixed effects
26
.
Statistical interferences 
All previous estimation methods are based on the assumption of no interferences between 
units (countries).
27
 As it is called in the literature, the stable-unit treatment value assumption
(SUTVA) requires that the observation on one country is unaffected by the particular 
assignment of treatments to the other countries. When the SUTVA holds, the effect of the 
treatment (the tax reform) compares two potential tax revenue-to-GDP responses that the 
country would exhibit under treatment and under control. If there is interference, then the 
country has not two, but many potential responses depending on the treatments assigned to 
other units.  
The existence of interferences among neighboring countries does not invalidate our results, 
since the estimates in the context of the reforms selected are potentially biased downward. 
Indeed, if one of the studied tax reforms is effective in improving revenue in one country, it 
is equivalent to an increase in the effective tax rate, and may trigger a positive tax base effect 
in neighboring countries (by inducing an outflow of mobile factors, such as capital and 
26
 See appendix available upon request. 
27
 One important type of interference between countries is tax spillovers. IMF (2014) highlights a significant and positive base spillover 
effect by analyzing the corporate income tax base for 173 countries over 1980-2013. This effect was particularly strong for developing 
countries. 
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 skilled labor, or cross-border shopping). Hence, neighboring countries may see their tax 
revenue increase without having engaged in any reforms.  
FIGURE 6. AVERAGE NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP: LTU ADOPTION EFFECT 
FIGURE 7. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR LTU 
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 FIGURE 8. AVERAGE NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP: VAT ADOPTION EFFECT 
FIGURE 9. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR VAT 
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 FIGURE 10. AVERAGE NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP: SARA ADOPTION EFFECT  
FIGURE 11. SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR SARA 
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 5. Conclusions
The results in this paper suggest that the adoption of VAT and SARA have a significant 
and positive impact on the non-resource taxes -to-GDP ratio in SSA, while LTU has a very 
low and insignificant impact. Moreover, the combination of VAT and SARA reinforces their 
individual effects on non-resource taxes, which takes several years to fully materialize. These 
results contrast with Keen and Lockwood (2010), who find that VAT does not increase total 
tax revenue (including resource revenue) in SSA countries.
28
 The exclusion of resource
revenue in this paper isolates the volatility of commodity prices and institutional factors, 
which reflect less the potential impact of the three studied reforms on domestic revenue 
mobilization.  
The absence of a direct impact from LTU adoption on non-resource taxes may seem 
surprising since size segmentation is a key feature of modern tax administrations—although 
as noted in the analysis of the probability of adoption of studied reforms, the indirect role of 
the LTU as a prerequisite for the adoption of VAT or SARA should not be neglected. Two 
additional reasons may explain the absence of a direct impact of LTUs on non-resource 
taxes. One relates to the concentration of revenue among large taxpayers in a few economic 
sectors in SSA countries. This concentration implies that tax administrations focused on large 
taxpayers even before LTUs were implemented; LTUs simply centralized services to large 
taxpayers, which may have had an impact on their compliance costs, but limited impact on 
revenue. A second reason is the use of information in risk management and audit, areas 
where LTUs may bring little, particularly when accompanying measures are missing, such as 
better access to information and effective information technology. Anecdotal evidence in 
SSA suggests that partial LTU reforms still occupy tax administrations today. Simply put, 
LTUs need to be better designed, including by implementing accompanying reforms 
simultaneously and not years after LTU is introduced. 
Several caveats to the analysis are worth noting. First, the benefits of tax reforms should be 
weighed against their costs, which differ across the various reforms, but can be significant—
28
 Keen and Lockwood (2010) study the probability of VAT adoption and its impact on revenue mobilization over 143 countries for 25 
years. They find on average a positive but modest effect, which becomes ambiguous when countries’ heterogeneity is taken into account. 
Études et Documents n° 11, CERDI, 2016
31
 e.g, setting up and running SARA,
29
 and administration and compliance costs of a VAT.
 30
Second, a number of SSA countries recently revised their GDP figures upward, and by a 
significant margin. These revisions were made after 2010, but may affect published GDP 
figures for years prior to 2010. To the extent that such revisions impact GDP differently 
across countries, they could affect the estimates of the impact of the three tax reforms. Third, 
the reforms considered may yield benefits other than revenue that cannot be captured in our 
analysis. The economic efficiency gains that can be obtained from replacing cascading sales 
taxes by VATs played a key role in their adoption in developed countries, but are generally 
neglected in SSA, where the majority of countries impose significant limitations on VAT 
refunds. LTU and SARA may reduce compliance costs to taxpayers by improving the 
efficiency of their services. They may also improve the perception of equity in the treatment 
of taxpayers. These potential gains are important and deserve further analysis.  
29
 SARAs in SSA have been largely supported by donors; their operational costs are estimated at about two percent of revenues 
collected.  
30
 PWC (2010) notes that VAT compliance consumes 125 hours on average (on a worldwide basis) while CIT needs 74 hours. With 135 
hours, the African continent is slightly above the worldwide average and below Latin America and the Caribbean, where 192 hours are 
necessary for VAT compliance (see Barbone et al., 2012 for a review of the cost of VAT).  
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 Appendix A. Data Sources and Tables 
The data sources are: 
Non-resource tax revenue: Mansour (2014). 
Date of adoption of the studied reforms: 
    LTU: Baer (2002), Fossat and Bua (2013). 
VAT: Tax Policy Division tax databases, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF. 
SARA: Kloeden (2011), Fjeldstad and Moore (2009). 
GDP and GDP per capita: World Economic Outlook, IMF. 
Aid in percent of GNI, Age dependency ratio, Agriculture value added in percent of GDP, 
Resource rent in percent of GDP, and Trade openness (exports and imports as percentage of 
GDP): World Development Indicators. 
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 Appendix B. Theoretical Formulation of the Impact of Tax Reform 
We observe J + 1 countries. Without loss of generality, let the first country be the one 
exposed to a certain type of tax reform (VAT, LTU or SARA), so that we have J remaining 
countries that serve as potential controls for each reform case. In comparative case studies, it 
is assumed that the treated unit (the tax reforming country) is uninterruptedly exposed to 
treatment after some initial intervention period. In our case, this is indeed the case as there 
are no cases reform reversals in our sample of countries.  
Following Abadie et al. (2010) and Cavallo et al. (2013), let 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be the non-resource tax-to-
GDP ratio that would be observed for country i at time t in the absence of the tax reform, for 
countries i = 1, … , J+1 and time periods t = 1, … , T. Let T0 be the number of periods before 
the disaster, with 1 ≤ T0 < T. Let 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐼  be the tax-to-GDP ratio that would be observed for
country i at time t if country i is exposed to a given tax reform its aftermath from period T0 + 
1 to T. Let 𝛼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐼 − 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁 be the effect of the tax reform for country i at time t if country i is
exposed to the reform in periods T0 + 1, T0 + 2, . . . , T (where 1 ≤ T0 < T). We therefore 
allow this effect to potentially vary over time. More formally, we have: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐼 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁 + 𝛼𝑖𝑡𝐷𝑖𝑡,
where Dit is an indicator that takes the value 1 if country i is exposed to the intervention (tax 
reform) at time t and value 0 otherwise. Let’s assume for now that only the country 1 has 
implemented the tax reform. Our parameters of interest are therefore (𝛼1,𝑇0+1, … , 𝛼1,𝑇 ), the
lead-specific causal effect of the tax reform event on the non-resource tax-to-GDP ratio. Note 
that 𝑅1𝑡
𝐼  is observed and equals to  𝑅1𝑡. Therefore, to estimate α1t, we need only to come up
with an estimate for 𝑅1𝑡
𝑁 .
Suppose that there exists a set of weights (𝑤2
∗, … , 𝑤𝐽+1
∗ ) satisfying ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗ = 1𝐽+1𝑗=2  such that: 
∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑅𝑗1 = 𝑌1,1
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 , … , ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑅𝑗𝑇0 = 𝑅1,𝑇0
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 , and  ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑍𝑗 = 𝑍1
𝐽+1
𝑗=2  with Zi the (r×1) vector 
of observed predictors for the tax-to-GDP ratio (dated before the reform takes place).
31
31
 This set of covariates is similar to the ones discussed in the previous estimations techniques. 
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 Abadie et al. (2010) suggest using: ?̂?1𝑡 = 𝑅1𝑡 − ∑ 𝑤𝑗
∗𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝐽+1
𝑗=2 , for t ∈ {T0 + 1, . . . , T} as an 
estimator of α1t. The set of weights 𝑤 is obtained by minimizing the distance between the 
observations of the treated unit 𝑍1 and the observations for the group of control 𝑍0𝑤 during 
the pre-treatment period. 
Recall our lead specific estimates of the tax reform the country of interest (say for now, 
country 1) are denoted by (?̂?1,𝑇0+1, … , ?̂?1,𝑇) for leads 1, 2, . . . , T − T0. Now consider taking
the average tax reform effect across all M tax reformers (all countries that have adopted a 
given tax reform in the sample). Assume for simplicity that for all these M cases, we are able 
to compute the T − T0 lead specific estimates of the tax reform impact. Following Cavallo et 
al. (2013), the estimated average effect for the R reforms is given by: 
?̅? = (?̅?𝑇0+1, … , ?̅?𝑇) =
1
𝑀
∑(?̂?𝑟,𝑇0+1, … , ?̂?𝑟,𝑇)
𝑀
𝑟=1
The usual statistical significance, based on regression-based standard errors, is not relevant 
in this case since the uncertainty regarding the estimate of ?̂?𝑖𝑡 does not come from 
uncertainty about the aggregate data. Uncertainty in comparative case studies with synthetic 
control is derived from uncertainty regarding the ability of the post-treatment synthetic 
control to replicate the counterfactual post-treatment in the treated observations. We now 
discuss how to combine the placebo effects to account for the fact that we will be interested 
in doing inference about the average (normalized) effect estimated across the country-
specific comparative case studies of each tax reform. 
We follow Cavallo et al. (2013), who extend the idea in Abadie et al. (2010) by 
generalizing the placebo approach to produce quantitative inference in comparative case 
studies for the average treatment effect. We compute the lead-specific significance level (p) 
for the estimated tax reform impact as follows: 
𝑝𝑙 = Prob(?̂?1,𝑙
𝑃𝐿 < ?̂?1,𝑙) =
∑ 𝐼(?̂?1,𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑗)
< ?̂?1,𝑙)
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
# of control countries
=
∑ 𝐼(?̂?1,𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑗)
< ?̂?1,𝑙)
𝐽+1
𝑗=2
𝐽
, 
where  ?̂?1,𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑗)
 is the lead l-specific effect of a tax reform when control country j is assigned a 
placebo tax reform at the same time as the treated country 1. ?̂?1,𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑗)
 is computed following 
the same procedure outlined for ?̂?1,𝑙. 
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 To conduct valid inference for ?̅? we follow Cavallo et al. (2013) and we use the following 
steps: 
(i) For each case of specific tax reform r of interest, we compute all the placebo
effects using the available controls jr = 2, . . . , JM + 1 corresponding to the
specific tax reform r.
32
(ii) At each lead, we compute every possible placebo average effect by picking a
single placebo estimate corresponding to each case of a particular reform r
and then taking the average across the R placebos. There are many possible
placebo averages:
𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ = Number of possible placebo averages=  ∏ 𝐽𝑟
𝑀
𝑟=1 .
We index all these possible placebo averages by np = 1, … , 𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ .This 
number grows very quickly in R and the typical Jr. 
(iii) We rank the actual lead-specific average tax reform effect ?̅?𝑙 in the
distribution of 𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅  average placebo effects (this involves 𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅  comparisons).
We compute the lead l specific p-value for the average effect as: 
𝑝𝑙 = Prob (
1
𝑀
∑ ?̂?𝑟,𝑙
𝑃𝐿
𝑀
𝑟=1
< ?̅?𝑙) = Prob(?̅?𝑙
𝑃𝐿 < ?̅?𝑙)
=
∑ 𝐼(?̅?𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑛𝑝)
< ?̅?𝑙)
𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅ ̅̅
𝑛𝑝=1
# of possible placebo averages
=
∑ 𝐼(?̅?𝑙
𝑃𝐿(𝑛𝑝)
< ?̅?𝑙)
𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅ ̅̅
𝑛𝑝=1
𝑁𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅
. 
32
 We were not able to construct valid counterfactuals for all the countries that have implemented a given tax reform in our sample 
(there are cases of tax reform for which we could not match the pre-event tax-to-GDP trajectory to that of a synthetic control group due to 
the large value taken by the root mean square prediction error, RMSPE). These cases are simply discarded from the analysis. Thus, 
discarding from the analysis the unmatched events is similar to confining the analysis to the “common support” when using matching 
estimators. 
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 Appendix C. Tables. Selected Statistics and Synthetic Control Weights 
TABLE A 1. NON-RESOURCE TAXES-TO-GDP AND ADOPTION DATES OF STUDIED REFORMS 
Change
1980-2010
1980 2010 (%) LTU VAT SARA
Angola 1/ 5.0 8.8 75.0
Benin 8.2 16.3 98.1 1995 1991
Botswana 13.4 18.2 36.4 2002 2003
Burkina Faso 8.4 13.0 54.1 2004 1993
Burundi 12.6 18.0 42.9 2003 2009 2010
Cameroon 10.9 11.5 6.1 2004 1999
Cape Verde 11.0 19.1 73.5 2004
Central African Republic 12.4 8.1 -34.7 1998 2001
Chad 1/ 2.4 9.9 307.4 1997 2000
Comoros 8.8 11.1 26.2 1994
Congo, Republic of 9.6 7.5 -21.7 1997 1997
Cote d' Ivoire 21.7 17.4 -19.9 1997 1960
Equatorial Guinea 16.7 1.8 -89.0 2005
Ethiopia 8.6 12.7 47.4 2001 2003 1997
Gabon 12.6 12.3 -2.4 2007 1995
Gambia 13.0 12.0 -7.5 2003 2005
Ghana 4.2 13.2 217.8 1998 1985
Guinea 5.5 10.9 96.9 1995 1996
Guinea-Bissau 6.8 8.3 21.8
Kenya 13.9 18.3 31.8 1998 1990 1996
Lesotho 27.2 36.8 35.0 2003 2001
Madagascar 16.1 10.7 -33.6 1996 1994
Malawi 14.3 17.4 21.9 1989 2000
Mali 9.2 12.4 34.7 1994 1991
Mauritius 17.3 18.8 8.2 1998 2005
Mozambique 7.5 18.1 142.2 1999 2006
Namibia 1/ 18.5 25.1 36.3 2000
Niger 12.3 12.3 -0.3 1998 1986
Nigeria 5.0 8.9 76.2 1994
Rwanda 9.6 12.0 25.0 2001 1998
Sâo Tomé and Principe 15.1 16.6 9.8
Senegal 17.4 18.1 3.7 2001 1980
Seychelles 30.7 31.2 1.7
Sierra Leone 12.9 11.7 -9.3 2003
South Africa 12.6 21.9 73.3 1997 1991 1997
Swaziland 15.7 24.4 56.0
Tanzania 14.2 15.8 12.0 1998 1996
Togo 26.9 15.7 -41.7 1995 1995
Uganda 2.7 11.8 340.5 1998 1996 1992
Zambia 23.0 16.4 -28.8 1995 1994
Zimbabwe 16.3 29.6 81.5 2004 2001
1/ First year of the database: Amgola (1996); Chad (1982); Namibia (1982). 
Country
Non-resource 
taxes-to-GDP (%)
Date Reform Adopted
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TABLE A 2. SYNTHETIC CONTROL WEIGHTS WHEN ASSESSING LTU IMPACT 
B
enin
B
urkina Faso
C
am
eroon
C
om
oros
C
ongo, 
R
epublic of 
C
ote d' Ivoire
G
hana
K
enya
M
adagascar
M
alaw
i
M
ali
M
auritius
R
w
anda
S
enegal
Tanzania
Togo
Zim
babw
e
(1995) (2004) (2004) (1994) (1997) (1997) (1998) (1998) (1997) (2000) (1994) (2005) (1998) (2001) (2001) (1995) (1994)
Botswana 0.513 0.047 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.068 0 0 0.534 0 0.118 0 0 0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cape Verde 0 0 0 0.775 0 0 0.125 0 0 0 0.407 0 0 0.343 0 0 0
CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 0.283 0.564 0.517 0.108 0 0.386 0.385 0.200 0.744 0.677 0.593 0 0.794 0.353 0.979 0.617 0.295
Namibia 0 0.023 0 0 0.398 0.614 0 0.416 0 0.309 0 0.466 0 0.186 0.021 0.383 0.705
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 0.203 0.366 0.483 0.117 0.602 0 0.490 0.384 0.188 0.015 0 0 0.206 0 0 0 0
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RMSPE 1.955 2.105 2.546 1.355 4.806 3.417 2.343 2.281 2.433 2.890 2.261 3.142 3.110 1.732 2.751 6.454 3.708
Notes: CAR: Central African Republic. Countries with missing data are excluded to allow the convergence of the estimation process, and compute the weights. 
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 TABLE A 3. SYNTHETIC CONTROL WEIGHTS WHEN ASSESSING VAT IMPACT 
B
enin
B
otsw
ana
B
urkina Faso
C
am
eroon
C
ape V
erde
C
entral A
frican 
R
epublic
G
hana
G
uinea
K
enya
Lesotho
M
alaw
i
M
ali
M
auritius
M
ozam
bique
N
am
ibia
Tanzania
Zim
babw
e
(1991) (2002) (1993) (1999) (2004) (2001) (1998) (1996) (1990) (2003) (1989) (1991) (1998) (1999) (2000) (1998) (1995)
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Comoros 0.720 0.703 0 0.513 0.847 0.236 0 0.128 0.445 0.128 0.857 0.975 0.760 0.727 0 0.701 0.717
Congo, Republic of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cote d' Ivoire 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Niger 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seychelles 0 0.031 0.097 0 0.153 0 0.061 0 0.178 0.872 0.143 0 0.240 0 0.543 0.009 0.283
Sierra Leone 0.280 0.266 0.903 0.487 0 0.764 0.939 0.872 0.376 0 0 0.025 0 0.273 0.457 0.29 0
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Togo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RMSPE 1.692 2.422 2.074 2.496 3.346 3.202 2.866 4.295 0.902 4.818 1.318 1.720 2.036 2.428 2.805 2.98 2.993
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TABLE A 4. SYNTHETIC CONTROL WEIGHTS WHEN ASSESSING SARA IMPACT  
Botswana Ethiopia Kenya Malawi Sierra 
Leone
Tanzania Uganda Zimbabwe
(2003) (1997) (1996) (2000) (2003) (1996) (1992) (1994)
Benin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Botswana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burkina Faso 0 0.266 0 0 0 0 0 0
Burundi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cameroon 0 0 0.219 0 0.305 0 0.580 0
Cape Verde 0.126 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chad 0 0 0 0 0.428 0 0.420 0
Comoros 0.510 0 0 0 0 0.089 0 0
Congo, Republic of 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.103
Cote d' Ivoire 0 0 0.436 0 0 0 0 0
Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0.263 0 0 0 0
Gabon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gambia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ghana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Guinea 0 0 0.030 0 0 0 0 0
Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Madagascar 0.365 0.153 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malawi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mali 0 0 0 0.489 0 0.705 0 0
Mauritius 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mozambique 0 0 0.316 0 0.267 0 0 0
Namibia 0 0 0 0.152 0 0 0 0.468
Niger 0 0.581 0 0 0 0 0 0
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senegal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.046
Seychelles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sierra Leone 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Togo 0 0 0 0.096 0 0.206 0 0.382
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RMSPE 2.618 0.987 2.418 1.951 2.591 1.708 1.224 1.662
Notes: CAR: Central African Republic. Countries with missing data are excluded to allow the convergence of the 
estimation process, and compute the weights. 
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